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Bowser v. State of Nevada, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 15 (May 16, 2019)1
APPELLATE LAW: SENTENCING IN A NEW TRIAL
Summary
The Court overruled precedent which held that a presumption of vindictiveness
applies when a judge imposes a longer sentence after a new trial.
Background
Following his first trial, Appellant Terrance Bowser was convicted on six counts:
first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon (count 2), discharging a firearm out of a
window (count 4), discharging a firearm into a structure or vehicle (count 6), and three
additional conspiracy charges. The district court sentenced him to two consecutive terms
of life with the possibility of parole after 20 years on the murder charge, 24-60 months on
count 4, and 12-60 months on count 6, all to run concurrent.
Bowser appealed the conviction. The conviction was reversed and remanded for
a new trial. On remand, Bowser was tried for the same 6 counts but with a different
judge presiding. Bowser was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, instead of first-degree
murder, and was convicted on counts 4 and 6. He was acquitted of the three conspiracy
charges. The district court conducting the retrial sentenced Bowser to 2 consecutive
terms of 48-120 months on count 2, 48-120 months on count 4 to run consecutive with
count 2, and 28-72 months on count 6 to run consecutive with count 4. Bowser then
appealed the new conviction because of the harsher sentences on counts 4 and 6.
Discussion
Majority Decision
A presumption of vindictiveness applies when a judge of a new trial imposes a
harsher sentence than the sentence given by the original district court judge. 2 The
presumption may be overcome if the more severe sentence is based on objective
indicators which appear on the record.3
In calculating whether Bowser’s new sentence was more severe than that of the
original trial, the Supreme Court analyzed the new sentence count-by-count. Under the
count-by-count method, Bowser received longer sentences for count 4 and 6.
Furthermore, the new sentence on count 4 was to run consecutive whereas originally it
would be concurrent. Therefore, the majority held that the new sentence was more severe
than the original sentence.
The presumption of vindictiveness only applies when “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part
of the sentencing authority.”4 Here, the Court concluded that the presumption does not
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apply where a different judge imposes a harsher sentence after retrial than the original
judge. In such circumstances, the likelihood of vindictiveness from the second judge is
minimal. Judges have broad discretion in sentencing, and any difference in the two
sentences reflects this discretion.
Stiglich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Judge Stiglich concurs with the majority’s decision to use the count-by-count
approach to determine the length of the sentence. He also concurs that Bowser’s second
sentence was harsher than the first. However, Stiglich disagrees with the majority’s
bright line rule that a presumption of vindictiveness does not occur if a second judge
imposes a longer sentence after retrial than the first judge imposed originally. Instead,
Stiglich writes that the presumption should not apply only when the second judge
articulates objective, nonvindictive rationale for the longer sentence.5
Conclusion
Applying the majority’s rule here, the second district court judge’s longer
sentence did not violate Bowser’s due process rights. Therefore, the judgment of
conviction from the second trial is affirmed.
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